THE FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHT OF FEMALE INMATES
TO BE FREE FROM CROSS-GENDER PAT-FRISKS
Jennifer R. Weiser∗
‘[U]se a flat hand and pushing motion across the [inmate’s]
crotch area. . . . [P]ush inward and upward when searching the
crotch area and upper thighs of the inmate.’ All seams in the leg
and the crotch area are to be ‘squeezed and kneaded.’ Using the
back of the hand, the guard also is to search the breast area in a
1
sweeping motion, so that the breasts will be ‘flattened.’

These were the training instructions given to male prison guards
at the Washington Corrections Center for Women (“WCCW”) when,
in February of 1989, the superintendent of the women’s correctional
facility instituted a pat-frisk policy that permitted male guards to
2
search the clothed bodies of female inmates. The change from a
same-gender to cross-gender random search policy was done in order
to create an “unpredictable element” within the institution so that
3
inmates would always be on guard about transporting contraband.
Yet, no regard was paid to the psychological effect this procedure
would have on the female inmates — eighty-five percent of whom
4
had been victims of physical and/or sexual abuse — who would be
∗
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1
Jordan v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1521, 1523 (9th Cir. 1993) (citing Washington
Corrections Center for Women prison training material).
2
Eldon Vail became the new WCCW Superintendent in January of 1989. Id. at
1523. Shortly thereafter, he authorized random searches because he thought the
fixed checkpoints were “ineffective in controlling the movement of contraband”
throughout the prison. Id. Then on February 26, 1989, Vail instituted another new
policy that permitted male guards to conduct random searches of female inmates
and took effect on July 5, 1989. Id.
3
Jordan, 986 F.2d at 1548 (Trott, J., dissenting). Vail asserted that if an inmate
knew there were only male guards in one area of the prison, then that inmate could
freely move contraband through that area. Id. at 1554.
4
Id. at 1525 (relying on a study conducted by a former child psychologist at the
prison).
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subjected to this highly intrusive form of unwanted sexualized
5
touching.
INTRODUCTION
Permitting male prison guards to touch the breasts and crotches
of female prisoners in the context of routine pat-frisks offends moral
6
and ethical standards of human dignity.
In addition, the
psychological consequences can be profound. Given the extreme
power imbalance in prison, these procedures have a clear
psychological parallel to childhood sexual abuse or adult rape or
sexual assault, and can bring to mind devastating experiences of past
7
violation. Nevertheless, courts have yet to declare clothed body

5

Pat-frisks involve physical contact that is commonly associated with sexualized
touching (e.g., the touching of the breast or vaginal area), especially when
performed on a woman by a man. Unwanted sexualized touching can have
deleterious psychological effects, particularly for women who have histories of sexual
abuse. For women, pat-frisks by females are less likely to be associated with
sexualized touching. Furthermore, there is a substantially lesser threat of other
females making inappropriate sexual contact, verbalizations, or intimidation.
Perpetrators of sexual abuse against females are almost exclusively male. See, e.g., Jan
Heney & Connie M. Kristiansen, An Analysis of the Impact of Prison on Women Survivors
of Childhood Sexual Abuse, WOMEN AND THERAPY 29-44 (1998); C.G. COLL ET AL., The
Experience of Women in Prison: Implications for Service and Prevention, WOMEN AND
THERAPY 11-28 (1998).
6
See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WOMEN’S RIGHTS PROJECT. ALL TOO FAMILIAR:
SEXUAL ABUSE OF WOMEN IN U.S. STATE PRISONS, 52-55 (1996), available at
http://www.hrw.org/reports/1996; United Nations Commission on Human Rights,
Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, REPORT OF THE
MISSION TO THE UNITED STATES ON ISSUE OF VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN IN STATE AND
FEDERAL PRISON (1999), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1999/68/Add.255-57, available at
http://www.unhchr.ch; AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, NOT PART OF MY SENTENCE:
VIOLATIONS OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN IN CUSTODY (1999), available at
http://web.amnesty.org.
Cross-gender pat-frisk policies also depart from
internationally accepted policy, which restricts the presence of male corrections
officers inside women’s prisons to non-contact positions or requires that any male
corrections officer be accompanied at all times by a female corrections officer. See
Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (SMR), adopted by the
First U.N. Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders,
held in Geneva in 1955, and approved by the Economic and Social Council by its
resolution 663 C (XXIV) of 31 July 1957 and 2076 (LXII) of 13 May 1977; see also
Martin A. Geer, Human Rights and Wrongs in Our Own Backyard: Incorporating
International Human Rights Protections Under Domestic Civil Rights Law — A Case Study of
Women in United States Prisons, 13 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 71 (2000) (analyzing the sexual
abuse of women by male corrections officials under international human rights
standards).
7
Researchers have established the capacity for unwanted sexual contact to
induce a resurfacing of emotions and beliefs associated with prior victimization,
creating the potential for retraumatization. See, e.g., Heney & Kristiansen, supra note
5, at 29-44.
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searches of females inmates by male corrections officers
8
unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment.
Whether and to what extent the Constitution protects prisoners’
bodily privacy and integrity is unclear because the Supreme Court has
9
never ruled on this issue. While most federal appellate courts have
recognized the retention of such a right, they differ in the extent to
which they have required prisoners’ privacy rights to yield to
10
institutional concerns.
Almost all of the cases that have challenged the constitutionality
of cross-gender searches under the Fourth Amendment have done so
in the context of allegations by male inmates that their privacy rights
11
were violated when searched by female officers. While some courts
have recognized that male inmates have a constitutionally-protected
12
privacy right to be free from strip and body-cavity searches by female
8

Most state Departments of Corrections have taken the initiative to prohibit
cross-gender pat-frisks through administrative regulations, recognizing that it is in
their best interest to fashion self-imposed limits on intimate cross-gender touching
because these types of searches are readily susceptible to abuses of power. See
National Institute of Corrections, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, SEXUAL MISCONDUCT
IN PRISONS: LAW, AGENCY RESPONSE AND PREVENTION (1996), available at
http://www.nicic.org/pubs/prisons.htm.
9
The sole Supreme Court pronouncement in the female guard/male prisoner
arena is Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977), in which the Court concluded that
the particularly dangerous, jungle-like conditions in the Alabama prisons made
women officers especially vulnerable to sexual attack. Id. at 334-36. Thus the Court
held that prison administrators had a sufficiently strong security interest in excluding
female guards despite their employment rights. Id. at 334. A strong dissent by
Justice Marshall, however, denounced the majority’s decision as depriving the
plaintiff of employment because of her womanhood, the very result that Title VII was
designed to prevent. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 340 (1977) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
10
See infra PART I.
11
The allegations in such cases are that the cross-gender search policies are
unreasonable or harmful specifically because a guard of the opposite gender is
conducting the otherwise reasonable search. See, e.g., Cornwell v. Dahlberg, 963 F.2d
912, 915 (6th Cir. 1992); Canedy v. Boardman, 16 F.3d 183, 184 (7th Cir. 1994);
Grummett v. Rushen, 779 F.2d 491, 492 (9th Cir. 1985).
12
During a strip search, a prisoner is required to completely disrobe in front of a
corrections official. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 558 n.39 (1979) (citing Wolfish
v. Levi, 573 F.2d 118, 131 (2d Cir. 1978)). In addition, the inmate may be asked to
open his mouth, display the soles of his feet, and present open hands and arms. Id.
Visual body-cavity examinations of male inmates involve the additional step of
bending over, lifting the genitals, and spreading the buttocks to allow a visual
inspection of the anus. Id. Females must follow a similar procedure, including a
visual vaginal inspection. Id. It should be noted, however, that jurisdictions define
these searches differently. For example, states like Illinois define strip searches to
include visual body-cavity examinations. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/103-1(d)
(2002). In contrast, New Jersey defines strip searches and body-cavity searches
separately, with the latter including both visual and manual searches of body-cavities.
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13

officers, most have upheld clothed body searches of male inmates by
14
female officers as “reasonable” under the Fourth Amendment.
These courts have considered the degree of nudity, the amount of
observation, whether the guard would touch the prisoner, and
whether the exclusion of the female guards promoted gender-based
15
stereotypes. Balancing the state’s “need for the particular search”
against the extent of the invasion suffered by the inmate, courts have
generally found that the institutional concerns of the prison
16
outweigh the intrusiveness of the searches.
17
There is only one case, Jordan v. Gardner, that has looked
directly at the reverse situation: female inmates subjected to clothed
body searches by male officers. While the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit found in favor of the female inmates in Jordan, it did so
18
under the Eighth Amendment rather than the Fourth Amendment.
In spite of the majority’s avoidance of a Fourth Amendment analysis,
Judge Reinhardt’s concurrence in that case has sparked a debate
regarding the appropriateness of the court’s analysis of cross-gender

N.J. STAT. ANN. 2A:161A-4 (2002).
13
See, e.g., Cornwell, 963 F.2d at 913-15 (finding that a Fourth Amendment claim
is stated when an inmate is strip-searched outdoors before several female
correctional officers after a prison uprising); Canedy, 16 F.3d at 184-88 (finding that a
Fourth Amendment claim is stated when female prison guards are routinely allowed
to conduct strip searches and observe male inmates “in various stages of undress”).
14
See, e.g., Grummett, 779 F.2d at 495-96 (finding no Fourth Amendment violation
where correctional officers of the opposite gender conduct routine pat-down
searches); Madyun v. Franzen, 704 F.2d 954 (7th Cir. 1983) (finding reasonable a
cross-gender pat-frisk policy in which female guards frisk male inmates ); Timm v.
Gunter, 917 F.2d 1093, 1099 (8th Cir. 1990) (finding policy allowing female guards
to pat-frisk and view naked male prisoners reasonable).
15
See, e.g., Timm, 917 F.2d at 1099 (discussing relevant factors).
16
See, e.g., Arruda v. Fair, 710 F.2d 886 (1st Cir. 1983) (finding a policy requiring
strip searches of security unit prisoners when entering or leaving the unit or after
meeting visitors justified because the prison operated under maximum security and
the unit housed the most dangerous prison inmates); Covino v. Patrissi, 967 F.2d 73,
78-79 (2d Cir. 1992) (finding a policy requiring random visual body-cavity searches
justified by security problems, despite the inmates’ subjective expectations of bodily
privacy); Elliott v. Lynn, 38 F.3d 188, 191-92 (5th Cir. 1994) (finding the subjection
of prisoners to visual body-cavity searches in the general presence of other inmates
and non-searching officers justified as part of an institution-wide shakedown
following an increase in murders); Thompson v. Souza, 111 F.3d 69, 697, 700 (9th
Cir. 1997) (finding that a visual strip-search of a prisoner is reasonably related to a
legitimate penological interest in keeping drugs out of the prison). In Thompson, the
court found no Fourth Amendment violation in spite of the fact that guards directed
prisoner to run his fingers around his gums after manipulating genitalia and
conducted the searches in view of other prisoners. Id.
17
986 F.2d 1521, 1533 (9th Cir. 1993).
18
Id. at 1522-23.

2002

35

CROSS-GENDER PAT-FRISKS
19

searches under the Eighth versus the Fourth Amendment. Little,
however, has been said about the majority’s reluctance to distinguish
Jordan from prior Fourth Amendment cases in which cross-gender
searches of male inmates by female officers were upheld.
This article explores the unwillingness of the Ninth Circuit to
analyze cross-gender, clothed body searches under search and seizure
law. It demonstrates that a finding that the cross-gender pat-frisks in
Jordan violated the Fourth Amendment would not have been
inconsistent with Fourth Amendment case law because the plaintiffs
in Jordan proved, based on statistical psychological evidence, an
unprecedented level of harm resulting from the cross-gender
searches. This harm renders the searches in Jordan “unreasonable”
when balanced against the institutional concerns of the prison.
The article begins with an overview of the application of the
Fourth Amendment in prison, particularly in the context of crossgender searches. Part II then summarizes the factual and legal
findings of the Ninth Circuit in Jordan. Part III addresses the
majority’s reluctance to decide the female inmates’ Fourth
Amendment claim. Part IV distinguishes Jordan from the cases
addressing clothed body searches of male inmates by female
corrections officers on the basis of the intrusiveness of the search.
Part V offers an explanation of the majority’s unwillingness to address
the Fourth Amendment issues and addresses potential feminist
concerns. The article concludes with an explanation of how the
court’s factual findings regarding the psychological harm caused by
cross-gender pat-frisks of female inmates support a legal finding that
the searches violate both the Fourth and Eighth Amendments.

19

See David J. Stollman, Comment, Jordan v. Gardner: Female Prisoners’ Rights to be
Free From Random, Cross-Gender Clothed Body Searches, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 1877 (1994)
(criticizing Jordan’s reliance on the Eighth Amendment and arguing that courts
should instead analyze cross-gender pat-frisk cases under the Fourth Amendment);
Rebecca Jurado, The Essence of Her Womanhood: Defining The Privacy Rights of Women
Prisoners and the Employment Rights of Women Guards, 7 AM U.J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L.
1 (1999) (criticizing Jordan’s majority and concurring opinions’ reliance on gender
stereotypes in analyzing the search under the Eighth and Fourth amendments
respectively); Lisa Krim, Essay, A Reasonable Woman’s Version of Cruel and Unusual
Punishment: Cross-Gender, Clothed-Body Searches of Women Prisoners, 6 UCLA WOMEN’S
L.J. 85 (1995) (arguing for review of cross-gender pat-frisks of female inmates under
the Eighth Amendment using a “reasonable woman” standard).
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I. PRISONERS’ CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
Unlike free citizens, prisoners are not entitled to the
20
Constitution’s full protection.
The Supreme Court has declared
that “imprisonment carries with it the circumscription or loss of many
21
significant rights,” particularly when the exercise of those rights
22
The Supreme Court has also
compromises a punitive objective.
made clear, however, that persons who have been convicted of crimes
do not forfeit all of their rights under the Constitution when they
23
pass through prison gates.
No “iron curtain” separates prison
24
inmates from constitutional protections.
Rather, inmates retain
“those rights not fundamentally inconsistent with imprisonment itself
25
or incompatible with the objectives of incarceration.” For example,
26
prisoners may not be subjected to invidious racial discrimination,
27
denied access to the courts, or subjected to cruel and unusual
28
29
They are entitled to due process of law and may
punishment.
30
petition the government for a redress of grievances. In short, while
the Supreme Court has held that prison inmates retain some
31
minimum level of Fourth Amendment rights, the scope of those

20

See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555 (1974) (declaring that “[l]awful
imprisonment necessarily makes unavailable many rights and privileges of the
ordinary citizen”).
21
Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 524 (1984) (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S.
520, 545 (1979)).
22
See Turner v. Safely, 482 U.S. 78, 85 (1987) (stating that judicial restraint and
deference to prison authorities must temper federal courts’ consideration of
prisoners’ constitutional claims).
23
Wolff, 418 U.S. at 555 (“[T]hough [a prisoner’s] rights may be diminished by
the needs and exigencies of the institutional environment, [he] is not wholly
stripped of constitutional protections when he is imprisoned for a crime.”); see
generally Patrick J.A. McClain et al., Substantive Rights Retained by Prisoners, 86 GEO. L.J.
1953 (1998) (discussing limited constitutional rights retained by prisoners, such as
the rights of freedom of speech, association, and religion; the right to procedural
due process; and the right to adequate assistance of counsel).
24
Wolff, 418 U.S. at 555-56.
25
Hudson, 468 U.S. at 523.
26
Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333 (1968) (per curium).
27
Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977).
28
Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1 (1992).
29
Wolff, 418 U.S. at 539.
30
Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969).
31
See Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139, 143-44 (1962) (confirming that convicted
prisoners and pretrial detainees retain Fourth Amendment rights while
incarcerated).
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32

A. The Fourth Amendment in Prison
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
guarantees “the right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
33
seizures.” In cases not involving prisoners, determining whether a
search of an individual violates the Fourth Amendment requires a
two-step analysis. First, a court must decide whether a person has a
34
“constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy.” This
requires a court to determine whether the individual has exhibited a
subjective expectation of privacy, and whether society recognizes that
35
expectation as reasonable.
Second, a court must determine
36
whether the governmental action is constitutional.
To make this
determination, a court must decide whether, in the particular
context, the interests asserted by the state actors are reasonable when
37
balanced against the individual’s privacy expectations.
Since prisoners have limited constitutional rights, courts do not
apply this same inquiry to the analysis of their Fourth Amendment
claims. Instead, courts analyze a prisoner’s Fourth Amendment claim
using the approach mandated by the Supreme Court in Turner v.
38
Safely, a class action suit brought by inmates challenging two prison
regulations relating to inmate-to-inmate mail correspondence and
39
inmate marriages. In Turner, the Supreme Court refused to apply
the strict scrutiny standard of review that the Eighth Circuit had used
32

See infra PART I.B.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment was made applicable to the
states through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Wolf v.
Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27-28 (1949), rev’d on other grounds, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643 (1961).
34
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). In
Katz, the Court disengaged the Fourth Amendment privacy analysis from a propertybased analysis, emphasizing that privacy attaches to people rather than to places. Id.
at 352-53; see also Covino v. Patrissi, 967 F.2d 73, 77 (2d Cir. 1992) (using the Katz
inquiry as the first step in its Fourth Amendment analysis).
35
Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
36
See Covino, 967 F.2d at 77-78.
37
See National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665-66
(1989).
38
482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987).
39
The first regulation limited correspondence between inmates at different
institutions and the second regulation prohibited inmate marriages unless the prison
superintendent approved the marriage due to “compelling reasons.” Id. at 78. The
Court upheld the limitation on the inmate-to-inmate correspondence, but struck
down the marriage restriction. Id. at 88-93, 97-99.
33
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40

to analyze male prisoners’ claims. Instead, it used a rational basis
41
test, stating that “when a prison regulation impinges on inmates’
constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related
42
to legitimate penological interests.”
The Court concluded that
when claims are evaluated under Turner, appropriate deference must
be given to prison officials because the judiciary is “ill-equipped to
deal with the increasingly urgent problems of prison administration
43
and reform.”
Before a court can analyze a prisoner’s Fourth Amendment
claim under Turner, it must first consider whether prisoners have
44
constitutionally-protected rights under the Fourth Amendment.
40

See Turner v. Safely, 777 F.2d 1307, 1313-14 (8th Cir. 1985), aff’d in part, rev’d in
part, 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
41
The rational basis test set forth in Turner has been the basis for review of most
prisoners’ claims of constitutional violations by prison officials since 1987. See James
E. Robertson, The Majority Opinion as the Social Construction of Reality: The Supreme Court
and Prison Rules, 53 OKLA. L. REV. 161, 180-81 (2000) (noting that after Turner, the
Supreme Court employed the rational basis test to uphold prison regulations
restricting religious practices, prohibiting prisoners’ receipt of publications, and
authorizing forced antipsychotic medication to a mentally competent inmate). Prior
to the Turner decision, the Court applied different levels of scrutiny to various
challenged prison regulations and practices alleged to infringe on prisoners’
constitutional rights.
Compare Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974)
(invalidating regulations restricting the content of inmate correspondence under the
“strict scrutiny” standard because of the implications for the free speech rights of
those not incarcerated) with Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners’ Labor Union, 433
U.S. 119 (1977) (upholding regulations restricting activities of a prisoner labor
union under a lower “reasonableness” standard due to the limitations on free
association inherent in incarceration).
42
Turner, 482 U.S. at 89. Although the Turner test appears to strike a balance
between the inmates’ rights and prison’s institutional concerns, courts uphold many
prison regulations under the rational-basis standard because of the current
application of the four factors and the extreme deference afforded to prison
administrators. For a discussion of deference afforded to prison administrators, see
supra note 16.
43
Turner, 482 U.S. at 84 (quoting Procunier, 416 U.S. at 405). Federal courts are
generally reluctant to interfere with the internal administration of prisons. See, e.g.,
Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 482 (1995) (citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539,
561-63 (1974), for the proposition that “federal courts ought to afford appropriate
deference and flexibility to state officials trying to manage a volatile environment.”);
Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 584-85 (1984) (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520,
540-541 (1979), for the principle that courts should defer to the “expert judgment”
of prison authorities); Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 352 (1981) (stating that
courts should not assume that prison officials are insensitive to constitutional
requirements or to the problems of achieving penal system goals); Jones v. North
Carolina Prisoners’ Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 126 (1977) (reasoning that
courts should give wide-ranging deference to decisions of prison officials).
44
Jordan v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1521, 1524 (9th Cir. 1993) (stating that before
turning to the Turner analysis the court must determine “how the inmate’s Fourth
Amendment rights are infringed”). If the court finds that prisoners have no such
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39

This inquiry is not entirely straightforward because the Supreme
Court has never addressed the issue of whether prisoners retain a
45
right to bodily privacy or dignity in their persons. The Supreme
Court has ruled that certain Fourth Amendment rights are
extinguished upon confinement in prison. Prisoners do not, for
example, have a reasonable expectation of privacy within the
46
confines of their cells and can be subjected to visual body-cavity
47
inspections. On the other hand, the Supreme Court has held that
the principal objective of the Fourth Amendment is the protection of
48
individual privacy rather than the protection of property.
The
Court has also held that the Fourth Amendment protects against
49
infringements of personal dignity and has stated that privacy and
50
Taken
dignity interests are most acute with respect to the body.
together, these decisions suggest that if prisoners do retain any
Fourth Amendment rights, they are limited.
Despite the Supreme Court’s failure to make a clear
pronouncement on the issue, most circuit courts have recognized
that inmates do, in fact, retain a limited Fourth Amendment right to
rights, Turner does not apply. See id.
45
A Nebraska magistrate judge aptly observed:
Although the Supreme Court has not specifically said that one has a
protected privacy right to urinate, defecate, or bathe outside the
viewing of a person of the opposite sex, or not to be touched in the
genital area, even through clothing, by a member of the opposite sex,
these things are so fundamental to personal dignity and self respect in
this culture that I believe if presented with such issues, the Supreme
Court would find one’s own body and its personal functions protected
by the recognized privacy rights of unincarcerated citizens.
Braasch v. Gunter, Nos CV83-L-459, CV83-l-682, 1985 WL 3530, at *10 (D. Neb. July
15, 1985), overruled by Timm v. Gunter, 917 F.2d 1093 (8th Cir. 1990).
46
Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 536 (1984) (holding “[t]hat the Fourth
Amendment has no applicability to a prison cell”).
47
Bell, 441 U.S. at 520, 560. In Bell, the Supreme Court recognized that
unclothed body searches or strip searches might be offensive. Id. Nevertheless, the
Court held these searches were neither unreasonable nor cruel and unusual when
done in a professional manner. Id. Although the Supreme Court held that bodycavity searches are reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, it has not indicated
that the gender of the guards conducting the searches is irrelevant. See id.
48
See Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U.S. 56, 64 (1992) (holding that tearing a
mobile home from the ground constituted a Fourth Amendment seizure even
though the seizure effected property instead of privacy interests, the fulcrum of
Fourth Amendment protection).
49
See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966) (“The overriding
function of the Fourth Amendment is to protect personal privacy and dignity against
unwarranted intrusion by the State.”).
50
Bell, 441 U.S. at 576-77 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(“body-cavity searches . . . represent one of the most grievous offenses against
personal dignity and common decency”).
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bodily privacy. For example, the Second Circuit has stated that it has
little doubt “[t]hat society is prepared to recognize as reasonable the
retention of a limited right of bodily privacy even in the prison
51
context.” Likewise, the Sixth Circuit has held that it joins others in
recognizing that a convicted prisoner maintains some reasonable
expectations of privacy while in prison, even though those privacy
52
rights may be less than those enjoyed by non-prisoners.
The
exception is the Seventh Circuit, which has held that the Fourth
53
Amendment does not protect privacy interests within prison.
Assuming arguendo that a prisoner has some Fourth Amendment
rights, a court must then determine whether the prison regulation is
54
reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. In Turner v.
Safely, the Supreme Court identified four factors in determining the
reasonableness of a prison regulation: 1) whether a “valid, rational
connection” exists “between the prison regulation and the legitimate
55
governmental interests” advanced to justify it; 2) “whether there are
alternative means of exercising the right that remain open to prison
56
inmates;” 3) whether and to what extent accommodation of the
asserted right will adversely affect guards, other inmates, and the
57
allocation of prison resources generally; and 4) whether an obvious
alternative to the regulation exists “that fully accommodates the
58
prisoner’s rights at de minimis cost to valid penological interests.”
59
Although the Court rejected a “least restrictive alternative” test, the
existence of easy alternatives may be evidence that the regulation is

51

Covino v. Patrissi, 967 F.2d 73, 78 (2d Cir. 1992).
Cornwell v. Dahlberg, 963 F.2d 912 (6th Cir. 1992); see also Fortner v. Thomas,
983 F.2d 1024 (11th Cir. 1993) (holding that prisoners have a constitutional right to
bodily privacy, which is obstructed when they are observed by the opposite sex in
their living quarters). In addition, the Tenth, Fourth, and Fifth Circuits have each
recognized such a right. Oliver v. Scott, 276 F.3d 736, 745 n.13 (5th Cir. 2002)
(noting several courts of appeals’ findings of a limited constitutional right to a
prisoner’s bodily privacy).
53
Johnson v. Phelan, 69 F.3d 144, 150 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that a prisoner’s
due process rights are not violated by a cross-gender prison guard’s observation of
his naked body); see also Somers v. Thurman, 109 F.3d 614, 619 (9th Cir. 1997)
(noting that “the Seventh Circuit stands alone in its peremptory declaration that
prisoners do not retain a right to bodily privacy”).
54
See Turner v. Safely, 482 U.S. 78, 89-91 (1987).
55
Id. at 89 (quoting Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 586 (1984)).
56
Id. at 90.
57
Id.
58
Id. at 90-91.
59
Turner, 482 U.S. at 90. Under a “least restrictive alternative” test, prison
officials would be required to “set up and then shoot down every conceivable
alternative method of accommodating” the asserted right. Id.
52
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an unreasonable, “‘exaggerated response’ to prison concerns.”
The Turner factors must be applied in light of the type of
constitutional violation involved and the circumstances of the
61
particular case. Bell v. Wolfish offers guidance on how Turner is to be
applied in “unreasonable” search cases:
In each case [the test of reasonableness] requires a balancing of
the need for the particular search against the invasion of personal
rights that the search entails. Courts must consider the scope of
the particular intrusion, the manner in which it is conducted, the
justification for initiating it, and the place in which it is
62
conducted.

Thus, the more intrusive the search, the heavier the government’s
63
burden of proving its reasonableness.
Applying these tests, the Supreme Court has concluded that strip
searches and visual body-cavity searches do not violate inmates’ rights
to be free from unreasonable searches because they are necessary to
64
maintain security.
It has also held that constant surveillance of
prisoners is constitutionally permissible because institutional security
65
needs outweigh prisoners’ privacy interests. Following the Supreme
Court’s pronouncement in this area, the Second, Fifth, Seventh,
Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have affirmed the constitutionality of
routine body-cavity and strip-searches on prisoners, according wideranging deference to the expertise of prison officials in determining
66
the appropriateness of these searches.
When, however, the basis of a challenge to a prison search is a
gender difference between a guard and prisoner, the Supreme Court
67
has provided little guidance to the lower federal courts.
The
60

Id.
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979).
62
Id.
63
United States v. Lilly, 576 F.2d 1240, 1245-46 (5th Cir. 1978) (establishing the
intrusiveness of the search as a key factor of the Fourth Amendment analysis).
64
See Bell, 441 U.S. at 560.
65
See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 527 (1984) (finding that institutional
security requires a “close and continual surveillance of inmates”).
66
See Covino v. Patrissi, 967 F.2d 73 (2d Cir. 1992); Elliott v. Lynn, 38 F.3d 188
(5th Cir. 1994); Peckham v. Wisconsin Dep’t of Corrs., 141 F.3d 694 (7th Cir. 1988);
Thompson v. Souza, 111 F.3d 694 (9th Cir. 1997); Harris v. Rocchio, 132 F.3d 42
(10th Cir. 1997).
67
When presented with the opportunity to address the constitutionality of crossgender searches, on four occasions the Supreme Court has denied certiorari to review
the opinions of lower federal courts. See Somers v. Thurman, 109 F.3d 614 (9th Cir.
1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 852 (1997); Johnson v. Phelan, 69 F.3d 144 (7th Cir.
1995), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1006 (1996); Tharp v. Iowa Dep’t of Corrs., 68 F.3d 223
(8th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1135 (1996); Smith v. Fairman, 678 F.2d 52 (7th
61
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Court’s silence on this issue leaves open the possibility that gender
may affect the balance between prisoners’ privacy and the
68
penological interests of an institution.
Searches by opposite-sex
guards may infringe upon inmates’ rights more than those by same69
sex guards. In addition, opposite-sex guards are not necessary to
maintain security. Thus, a prison’s use of opposite-sex guards may be
found to violate constitutional rights to privacy unless the prison can
show another legitimate goal besides maintaining security, such as
70
promoting equal employment opportunity.
B. Caselaw on Cross-Gender Pat-frisks
Federal judges appear to be somewhat uncomfortable
sanctioning searches conducted by guards of the opposite sex. This
discomfort is heightened when the search is highly intrusive,
involving physical contact with breasts, genitalia, and anal areas.
Nevertheless, the federal courts that have considered the
constitutionality of cross-gender pat-frisks have generally held that
while prisoners have a limited right to privacy, their interest in
protecting bodily privacy is not as strong as the state’s interest in
internal security or equal opportunity employment for correctional
officers.
71
For example, in Grummet v. Rushen, the Ninth Circuit upheld
pat-down searches by female officers of male inmates that included

Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 907 (1983).
68
The searches at issue in Katz, Bell, and Hudson, the seminal Supreme Court
cases, were not cross-gender searches. The Court was therefore not required to
address the legal significance of the gender of the guard and prisoner in either the
main body or dicta of the opinions.
69
The majority of the courts that have analyzed the privacy side of the balancing
test have concluded that when opposite-sex guards perform the touching and
viewing necessary to maintain security, they infringe on inmates’ privacy rights more
than if guards of the same gender performed the duties. See, e.g., Forts v. Ward, 471
F. Supp. 1095 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (concluding that when same-sex guards perform
contact duties, they invade prisoner privacy less than when opposite-sex guards
perform the same duties). But see Griffin v. Michigan Dep’t of Corrs., 654 F. Supp.
690, 703 (E.D. Mich. 1982) (rejecting as a stereotypical sexual characterization the
argument that the viewing of an inmate while nude or performing bodily functions,
by a member of the opposite sex, is intrinsically more odious than the viewing by a
member of one’s own sex).
70
In Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974), the Supreme Court indicated that
prisoners retain constitutional rights that are “[n]ot inconsistent . . . with the
legitimate penological objectives of the corrections system.”
Since equal
employment is not clearly a penological objective, courts may reject it as a legitimate
reason for infringing on inmates’ rights.
71
779 F.2d 491 (9th Cir. 1985).

2002

CROSS-GENDER PAT-FRISKS

43

72

the groin area. Analyzing these claims under both the Fourteenth
73
and Fourth Amendment, the court concluded that the pat-down
74
searches did not violate the privacy interests of the male inmates.
Under the Fourteenth Amendment, the court assumed that the male
inmates retained the right to shield their naked bodies and genitals
from members of the opposite sex, yet found that the state had
“devised the least intrusive means to” further the state’s interest in
75
prison security. Similarly, the court assumed, but did not find, that
prisoners retained Fourth Amendment protections while
incarcerated: specifically, a legitimate expectation of privacy in
shielding their naked bodies and genitals from members of the
76
opposite sex.
Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit upheld the prison
regulations under the Fourth Amendment because it believed that
77
security needs justified the pat-down searches. The court further
found the cross-gender aspect of the searches “reasonable” because
they were done briefly and professionally while inmates were fully
78
clothed.
Applying the Turner standard, the Eighth Circuit held in Timm v
Gunter that cross-gender, pat-down searches did not violate male
inmates’ privacy rights. The Court concluded that prohibiting female
officers from conducting pat-down searches, which included the
groin area of male inmates “[could] severely impede overall internal
79
security.” Furthermore, the court reasoned that the limitation on
female guards would create “resentment by male guards, tension
among male and female employees, [and a] deterioration of
80
morale.”
81
In Smith v. Fairman, the Seventh Circuit found that “inmates do
have some right to avoid unwanted intrusions by persons of the
82
opposite sex,” suggesting that this protection can be found in the
Fourth Amendment or in the more general right to personal

72

Id. at 492.
See id. at 493 n.1.
74
Id. at 496.
75
Id. at 494.
76
See id. at 493.
77
Grummett, 779 F.2d at 494. The court did not, however, indicate that the
security of the institution depended on female officers conducting the searches. See
id.
78
Id. at 495.
79
Timm v. Gunter, 917 F.2d at 1100 n.10.
80
Id.
81
678 F.2d 52 (7th Cir. 1982).
82
Id. at 55 (emphasis added).
73
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83

privacy.
The court nevertheless upheld the prison’s policy of
allowing female guards to conduct pat-down searches of male
inmates, holding that the inmates’ privacy interests had been
accommodated because the searches were limited so as not to include
84
the groin area. The court implied, however, that had the searches
included the genital area, a constitutional violation would have been
85
86
found. One year later, in Madyun v. Franzen, the Seventh Circuit
again ruled that a pat-down search performed by a female officer did
not violate the inmate’s Fourth Amendment rights because the
87
search did not require deliberate examination of the genital area.
88
In Michenfelder v. Sumner, the plaintiff, a male inmate, alleged
that the policy of female guards viewing unclothed male prisoners
during strip-searches was an unconstitutional infringement of
89
prisoners’ privacy rights.
The Ninth Circuit concluded, however,
that infrequent and casual observation by female officers is “not so
90
degrading as to warrant court interference.” The court reasoned
that requiring men to replace female employees during strip searches
91
would displace officers throughout the prison.
Moreover, “the
prison’s current allocation of responsibilities among male and female
employees already represent[ed] an attempt to accommodate
prisoners’ privacy concerns consistent with internal security needs
92
and equal employment concerns.”
Although there is little consistency in the federal case law on
cross-gender pat-frisks, there is a movement away from mutual
accommodation of privacy and employment rights and an increasing
tendency for courts to override prisoner privacy claims when the
justification for a pat-search policy is institutional security or equal

83

Id. at 53-54.
Id. at 55. Female officers were not permitted to conduct full searches and were
given “explicit instructions not to search the genital area.” Id. at 53.
85
Id. at 55 (distinguishing this case from a case that found a Fourth Amendment
violation where female corrections officers performed full frisks of a male inmate’s
anal and genital areas). Given Judge Easterbrook’s very different analysis of
prisoners’ Fourth Amendment rights in more recent cases, such as Johnson v. Phelan,
69 F.3d 144 (1995), it is safe to assume that Fairman would be decided differently
today.
86
704 F.2d 954 (7th Cir. 1983).
87
Id. at 957. Again, given the Johnson decision, the Seventh Circuit would likely
not be as generous today.
88
860 F.2d 328 (9th Cir. 1988).
89
Id. at 329-30.
90
Id. at 334.
91
Id.
92
Id.
84
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93

employment opportunity. This trend is predicated on two beliefs:
1) the opportunity for female officers to advance within the state’s
94
correctional hierarchy is extremely important; and 2) the viewing or
95
touching of men by women does not significantly harm men.
While, however, the degree of invasiveness of the cross-gender patfrisk is probative, it is not always determinative of the constitutionality
96
of the search.
II. JORDAN V. GARDNER
On July 5, 1989, male guards at the WCCW began performing
clothed body searches of female inmates that included the touching
97
of the breast and genital areas. During that day, guards searched
98
several inmates, one of whom suffered tremendous anguish. After
reluctantly submitting to the search, this inmate “had to have her
fingers pried loose from the bars she had grabbed during the search,
99
and she vomited after returning to her cell block.”
That same day, the WCCW inmates filed a pro se complaint in the
Western District of Washington requesting a preliminary injunction
prohibiting male guards from performing random, clothed body
100
searches on female prisoners.
The inmates were granted a
101
temporary restraining order.
They were later granted a
102
preliminary injunction and certified as a class.
After a bench trial, the district court held that the cross-gender
searches at WCCW violated the female inmates’ First, Fourth, and
103
Eighth Amendment rights. The district court concluded that:

93

See Teresa A. Miller, Sex Surveillance: Gender, Privacy & the Sexualization of Power
in Prison, 10 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 291, 297 (2000) (arguing that “driven by
security concerns” courts have “favor[ed] statutorily derived employment rights over
constitutionally derived privacy”).
94
See, e.g., Michenfelder, 860 F.2d at 334 (recognizing prison’s legitimate interest
in providing equal employment opportunities).
95
See, e.g., Grummett v. Rushen, 779 F.2d 491 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that
females viewing male prisoners while naked is not degrading enough to warrant
intervention by the courts).
96
See id.
97
See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
98
Jordan v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1521, 1523 (9th Cir. 1993).
99
Id.
100
Id.
101
Id.
102
Appellees’ Brief at 9, Jordan v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1521 (9th Cir. 1993) (Nos.
90-35307/90-35552).
103
Jordan v. Gardner, No. C89-339TB (W.D. Wash. Feb. 28, 1990), rev’d, 953 F.2d
1137 (9th Cir. 1992), vacated and superseded en banc, 986 F.2d 1521 (9th Cir. 1993).
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under the laws of the State of Washington and other states . . .
some areas of the human body have more privacy attached to
them than do other parts. The standards of decency in society
also recognize a right to privacy in the intimate parts of a human
104
body.

Turning to the Fourth Amendment claim, the district court relied on
Turner v. Safely and held that the cross-gender, clothed body searches
105
were unreasonable and thus violated the Fourth Amendment.
A panel of the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court on all
106
three grounds.
The Ninth Circuit then granted an en banc
107
rehearing of the case and vacated the panel decision. A majority of
the judges affirmed the district court’s holding as it pertained to the
Eighth Amendment, but only a plurality agreed on the Fourth
108
Amendment grounds.
Judge O’Scannlain, writing for four judges,
refused to address the inmates’ First and Fourth Amendment claims
after concluding that the cross-gender searches were unconstitutional
109
under the Eighth Amendment.
A. The Ninth Circuit Majority Opinion
The majority began its opinion by clarifying its reasons for
declining to decide the case under the Fourth Amendment and
110
instead proceeding under the Eighth Amendment.
Judge
O’Scannlain, writing for the majority, noted that courts have not yet
recognized that the Fourth Amendment protects inmates from cross111
gender, clothed body searches, whereas the right to be free from
112
Second, the
“unwarranted infliction of pain” is clearly established.
majority reasoned that the evidence put forward by the inmates
focused on the pain inflicted by the cross-gender, clothed body
113
searches, rather than on their expectations of privacy.
Lastly, the
majority found that once it had affirmed the district court’s decision
on Eighth Amendment grounds, it was unnecessarily duplicative to

104

Id. at 9.
Id. at 12.
106
953 F.2d 1137 (9th Cir. 1992), vacated and superceded en banc, Jordan v. Gardner,
986 F.2d 1521 (9th Cir. 1993).
107
Jordan v. Gardner, 968 F.2d 984 (9th Cir. 1992) (granting rehearing en banc).
108
See Jordan, 986 F.2d 1521.
109
Id. at 1524 n.3.
110
Id.
111
Id. at 1524-25.
112
Id. at 1525.
113
Id. at 1524.
105
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114

address the inmates’ Fourth Amendment claim.
In analyzing the inmates’ Eighth Amendment claim, the court
concluded that sufficient evidence had been presented to the district
court to meet the constitutional standard for a finding of “infliction
115
of pain.”
The court noted that the female inmates in the
institution had histories of sexual and physical abuse by men, and
that experts support the conclusion that women react differently than
116
men to unwanted intimate touching by the opposite sex. The court
also found compelling expert testimony stating that female inmates
who had prior histories of abuse were likely to be re-victimized by the
unwilling submission to intimate contact of their breasts and genitals
117
Thus, the high probability that survivors of abuse would
by men.
suffer severe psychological injury and emotional pain and suffering
led the court to find that the random cross-gender searches caused
sufficient pain to constitute an Eighth Amendment violation.
The court next determined that this infliction of pain was
unnecessary and wanton because the security of the institution did
118
not depend upon the cross-gender aspect of the search.
Furthermore, the court found that the inmates had met their burden
of establishing deliberate indifference on the part of the
superintendent, by showing that in implementing the cross-gender
search policy he had disregarded the concerns of his advisors
119
regarding the possible psychological trauma to the inmates.
In order to reach this conclusion, the Ninth Circuit had to
120
distinguish Jordan from Grummett v. Rushen, a Ninth Circuit case
that had permitted similar cross-gender searches of male inmates by
female guards. It was able to do so for two reasons. First, Grummett
121
involved searches that were much less invasive.
Second, the male
inmates were unable to establish a finding of pain under the Eighth
Amendment because they could point to nothing more than
122
“momentary discomfort caused by the search procedures.”
According to Judge O’Scannlain, “[n]othing in Grummett indicates
114

Jordan, 986 F.2d at 1525.
Id. at 1526.
116
Id. at 1525-26.
117
Id. at 1526.
118
Id. at 1528.
119
Jordan, 986 F.2d at 1528.
120
779 F.2d 491 (9th Cir. 1985).
121
See Jordan, 986 F.2d at 1524 (noting that the frequency and scope of the female
guards’ pat-down searches of male inmates in Grummett were significantly less invasive
than the ones at issue before the court).
122
Id. at 1526.
115
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that the men had particular vulnerabilities that would cause the crossgender clothed body searches to exacerbate symptoms of pre-existing
123
mental conditions.”
In contrast, the female inmates at WCCW
could show on the basis of expert psychological and anthropological
124
testimony that they were traumatized by cross-gender searches.
The majority concluded that it was proper to consider this gender
difference in evaluating the objective part of the women’s claim—
125
whether the searches constituted an “infliction of pain.”
B. Judge Reinhardt’s Concurrence
Although Judge Reinhardt believed that the cross-gender search
policy in Jordan violated both the Fourth and Eighth Amendments, he
suggested in his concurrence that the case should have been decided
126
on Fourth, rather than Eighth Amendment grounds.
Judge
Reinhardt offered several reasons why a Fourth Amendment analysis
is preferable. First, Judge Reinhardt viewed the conduct at issue as
clearly a search and noted that “[t]he ‘explicit textual source of
constitutional protection’ with respect to ‘searches’ of ‘persons’ is,
without doubt, the Fourth Amendment, not the more general Eighth
127
Amendment.”
Second, Judge Reinhardt asserted that the Fourth
Amendment is easier to apply than the Eighth Amendment,
suggesting that while the Fourth Amendment requires only an
objective inquiry, the Eighth Amendment requires a more
128
complicated subjective inquiry.
Third, Judge Reinhardt reasoned
that it would be more efficient to apply the Fourth Amendment
because any search that violated the Eighth Amendment would be an
129
“unreasonable” search under the Fourth Amendment.
Next, Judge Reinhardt examined the Fourth Amendment rights
retained by prisoners. The judge reasoned that in addition to
protecting privacy, the Fourth Amendment “also protects persons
against infringements of bodily integrity and personal dignity. . . . It

123

Id.
Id.
125
Id.
126
Jordan, 986 F.2d at 1540-41 (Reinhardt, J., concurring).
127
Id. at 1541 (Reinhardt, J., concurring). Judge Reinhardt challenged the
majority’s application of the Eighth Amendment on the grounds that the
fundamental conduct at issue in Jordan was the search, not the pain inflicted by the
search. See id. at 1540 (Reinhardt, J., concurring) (“Pain is simply an incident of the
unreasonable searches, not, as Judge O’Scannlain would have it, ‘the gravamen of
the inmates’ charge.’”).
128
Id. at 1541 n.16 (Reinhardt, J., concurring).
129
Id. at 1542 (Reinhardt, J., concurring).
124
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is the privacy and dignitary interests of the female inmates that are
130
violated here.”
Thus, Judge Reinhardt concluded that random,
cross-gender, clothed body searches implicate a prison inmate’s
131
rights of privacy and dignity.
Once Judge Reinhardt recognized that female inmates do, in
fact, possess a right to bodily privacy, he analyzed their claim under
the four factors enumerated in Turner. First, considering prison
administrators’ assertions that prison security interests and guards’
equal employment rights justified these searches, he found that “the
connection between any legitimate penological interest and cross132
gender searches [was] tenuous.”
Second, he recognized that since
inmates cannot escape these searches by virtue of their incarceration,
the cross-gender search policy left them with “no means of protecting
133
their bodies against unreasonable searches.”
Third, Judge
Reinhardt analyzed the impact that the accommodation of the
inmates’ constitutional rights would have on other inmates and
found that “[h]ere, there will, of course, be no adverse effect of any
kind on other inmates if female guards instead of male guards
134
conduct the body searches . . . .” Finally, he found that an obvious,
easy alternative was available: the prison could use only female guards
135
to perform these searches.
Although this alternative would require
administrative adjustments, these adjustments would be “relatively
insignificant, both in themselves and when weighed against the
136
constitutional interests at stake.”
In applying the Bell balancing test, Judge Reinhardt addressed
the two interests that prison administrators advanced in support of
the cross-gender, clothed body searches, namely prison security and
137
guards’ equal employment rights.
Judge Reinhardt rejected the
prison administrators’ security argument because the record showed
that the injunction imposed by the district court, which had since
enjoined the prison from implementing its cross-gender pat-frisk
138
policy, did not impair security in any way.
Judge Reinhardt found
that the government’s additional argument that barring male guards
from conducting random searches would require adjustments “of
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138

Id. at 1534 n.7 (Reinhardt, J., concurring) (internal citation omitted).
Jordan, 986 F.2d at 1534 (Reinhardt, J., concurring).
Id. at 1536 (Reinhardt, J., concurring).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1536-37 (Reinhardt, J., concurring).
Id. at 1537 (Reinhardt, J., concurring).
Jordan, 986 F.2d at 1537-39 (Reinhardt, J., concurring).
Id. at 1538 (Reinhardt, J., concurring).
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staff schedules and job responsibilities, and the overriding of the bid
system in the collective bargaining agreement” also lacked merit.
The judge noted that prison authorities had not changed a single
139
guard’s job during the injunction period.
Next, Judge Reinhardt analyzed the invasion of personal rights
engendered by the searches, agreeing with the district court’s
determination “that an unknown number of” female inmates would
140
suffer substantial harm from cross-gender searches.
Judge
Reinhardt completed his Fourth Amendment analysis by balancing
the prison officials’ interests against the harm inflicted on the
141
inmates.
As a result, Judge Reinhardt found that the cross-gender,
clothed body search policy failed the Bell v. Wolfish test because “the
harm the policy inflict[ed] on the inmates and the injury it [did] to
their constitutional rights” significantly outweighed the prison
142
administration’s interests.
C. Judge Trott’s Dissent
In dissent, Judge Trott addressed the question of which Eighth
143
Amendment standard of wantonness to apply in Jordan.
First, he
noted that the majority’s opinion would cause several problems, such
as the creation of “a special class of untouchable prisoners” by
exempting any previously sexually abused prisoner, whether female
or male, from random pat-frisks “by a person of the gender of the
144
prisoner’s abuser.”
Fearful that too many prisoners would qualify
for such protection, he applied the malice standard, a more difficult
145
burden for prisoners to meet.
Judge Trott concluded that the
inmates’ failed to prove the “wanton” element of an Eighth
146
Amendment violation, because Superintendent Vail had not acted
maliciously or sadistically, but rather had acted in good faith when he
139

Id. at 1539 (Reinhardt, J., concurring).
Id.
141
Id. at 1540 (Reinhardt, J., concurring).
142
Id.
143
Jordan, 986 F.2d at 1558 (Trott, J., dissenting). The Supreme Court has
outlined two different “wanton” standards. In cases in which a prison official’s
decision does not conflict with competing administrative concerns, the deliberateindifference standard applies. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)
(holding that prison officials’ deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s medical needs
after suffering an injury during the course of prison work would constitute cruel and
unusual punishment and violate the Eighth Amendment). In excessive force cases,
the malice standard applies. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320 (1986).
144
Jordan, 986 F.2d at 1561 (Trott, J., dissenting).
145
Id.
146
Id. at 1566 (Trott, J., dissenting).
140
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147

implemented the cross-gender searches.
D. Judge Wallace’s Dissent

Chief Judge Wallace’s dissent followed Judge Trott’s reasoning
148
in all but one respect.
Chief Judge Wallace disagreed with Judge
Reinhardt’s Fourth Amendment analysis, reasoning that it
impermissibly combined the balancing test from Bell v. Wolfish with
149
the four Turner factors.
According to Chief Judge Wallace, because
Turner had essentially overruled Bell, such balancing was
150
inappropriate.
III. THE MAJORITY’S RELUCTANCE TO DECIDE THE INMATES’ FOURTH
AMENDMENT CLAIM
The Jordan majority justified its decision not to decide the female
inmates’ Fourth Amendment claim by questioning the extent to
151
which prisoners retain a right to bodily privacy, despite the Ninth
152
Circuit’s previous recognition of such a right. In its brief discussion
of Fourth Amendment precedent, the court did not address whether
searches of female inmates by male guards could be differentiated
from searches of male inmates by female guards. The failure to
discuss gender with respect to the plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment
claim is curious for a number of reasons. First, both the district court
and a panel of the Ninth Circuit addressed the issue of a gender
difference and reached opposite conclusions with respect to its
153
significance.
Second, the majority gave great consideration to
154
gender in its analysis of the inmates’ Eighth Amendment claim.
Third, some of the relevant case law on cross-gender searches
acknowledges the differential effect that such searches may have on

147

Id. at 1561 (Trott, J., dissenting).
Jordan, 986 F.2d at 1566-67 (Wallace, C.J., dissenting).
149
Id. at 1566-67 (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 529 (1979); Turner v. Safely,
482 U.S. 78, 89-91(1987)); see also Turner, 482 U.S. at 89-91.
150
Jordan, 986 F.2d at 1567 (Wallace, C.J., dissenting).
151
Id. at 1524-25 (“Although the inmates here may have protected privacy
interests in freedom from cross-gender clothed body searches, such interests have
not yet been judicially recognized.”).
152
See, e.g., Michenfelder, 860 F.2d at 333 (“We recognize that incarcerated
prisoners retain a limited right to bodily privacy.”); Grummet v. Rushen, 779 F.2d
491, 494 (9th Cir. 1985) (stating that “the right of privacy is a fundamental right”).
153
See Jordan v. Gardner, No. C89-339TB (W.D. Wash. Feb 28, 1990); Jordan v.
Gardner, 953 F.2d 1137 (9th Cir. 1992), vacated and superseded en banc, 986 F.2d
1521(9th Cir. 1993).
154
See Jordan, 986 F.2d at 1526.
148
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women.
Therefore it would not have been inconsistent for the
Ninth Circuit, in its analysis of the reasonableness of the cross-gender
searches at issue in Jordan, to have considered how the gender of the
inmates influenced their subjective experiences of the pat-frisks.
A. Conflicting Considerations of Gender in Earlier Jordan Decisions
A panel of the Ninth Circuit found in 1992 that cross-gender
searches do not violate the Fourth Amendment because there was
“no principled way to distinguish Grummett,” an earlier Ninth Circuit
case, which “rejected a constitutional challenge to a prison policy that
permitted female guards to perform pat-searches of clothed male
156
inmates and occasionally view naked inmates.”
Although the panel
justified its position with several factual comparisons between the two
cases, it gave no consideration to what the district court found was
the most significant fact distinguishing this case from Grummett—the
extreme psychological effects of the searches on women who have
157
histories of physical and sexual abuse at the hands of men.
Because the two prior decisions in Jordan reflect alternative
perspectives on whether the case is distinguishable from precedent
on the basis of the differential psychological effect of the searches on
female inmates, one would expect the Ninth Circuit to have
addressed the issue when it reheard the case en banc. However, in the
en banc decision, the Ninth Circuit remained silent on the question
of a gender distinction and determined that Grummett and
158
Michenfelder did not control.
The court reasoned that the
frequency and scope of the searches in those cases were “significantly
159
less invasive.”
While one can presume that the gender of the
inmates in Jordan factored into the court’s Fourth Amendment
155

See, e.g., Colman v. Vasquez, 142 F. Supp.2d 226, 232 (D. Conn. 2001) (noting
that “a number of courts have viewed female inmates’ privacy rights vis-à-vis being
monitored or searched by male guards as qualitatively different than the same rights
asserted by male inmates vis-à-vis female prison guards”). In Timm v. Gunter, for
example, the Eighth Circuit held that differences in privacy protections afforded
male and female inmates do not violate the Fourteenth Amendment equal
protection clause as male and female inmates “are not similarly situated.” 917 F.2d
1093, 1102-03 (8th Cir. 1990) quoting Timm v. Gunter, No. CV85-L-501, at 15-16 (D.
Neb. Dec. 13, 1988) (Memorandum of Decision).
156
Jordan, 953 F.2d at 1141.
157
See id. The district court found “[p]hysical, emotional and psychological
differences between men and women may well cause women, and especially
physically and sexually abused women, to react differently to searches of this type
than would male inmates subjected to similar searches by women.” Jordan v. Gardner,
Do. C89-339T B (W.D. Wash. Feb. 28, 1990).
158
Jordan, 986 F.2d at 1524.
159
Id.

2002

CROSS-GENDER PAT-FRISKS

53

analysis of the intrusiveness of the searches, the majority did not
160
explicitly make this point.
The majority raised the significance of
the inmates’ gender only in the context of the inmates’ Eighth
Amendment claim.

B. The Majority’s Gender-Based Analysis of “Pain” Under the Eighth
Amendment
The Ninth Circuit, in determining whether cross-gender,
clothed body searches constituted an objectively cruel and unusual
condition of confinement, considered the psychological impact of
the cross-gender searches from the perspective of the female
161
inmates.
The court paid particular attention to the prevalence of
sexual abuse histories among the female inmate population, noting
that:
The record in the case, including the depositions of several
inmates . . . describes the shocking histories of verbal, physical,
and, in particular, sexual abuse endured by many of the inmates
prior to their incarceration at WCCW. For example, [one
inmate], who gave live trial testimony, described rapes by
strangers (twice) and by husbands or boyfriends. She described
how she had been beaten by various men in her life. Two
deprived her of adequate food; one pushed her out of a moving
car. [Her] story is not unique. Eighty-five percent of the inmates
report a history of serious abuse to WCCW counselors, including
162
rapes, molestations, beatings, and slavery.
163

Relying on a Ninth Circuit sexual harassment case, Ellison v. Bradley,
the court found that “because women are disproportionately victims
of rape and sexual assault,” they may respond differently than men in
164
situations that are sexually charged.
The court reasoned that since
men and women are vulnerable in different ways, the severity and
pervasiveness of sexual harassment should be evaluated from the
165
victim’s perspective.
Thus, the court held that due to the
“differences in the experiences of men and women with regard to
166
sexuality,”
the cross-gender nature of the searches caused an
unconstitutional level of “pain” for all female inmates, even those
160
161
162
163
164
165
166

See id.
Jordan, 986 F.2d at 1526.
Id. at 1525.
924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991).
Jordan, 986 F.2d at 1526.
Id. at 1526 n.5.
Id. at 1526.
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who did not have a history of sexual abuse.
By reaching the conclusion that the female inmates at WCCW
may suffer harm if subjected to intrusive, clothed body searches
conducted by male guards, the court was able to distinguish prior
case law. The court noted that similar searches of male prisoners by
female guards had not been shown to cause the same level of
168
psychological harm.
In Grummett, for example, the court asserted
that the male “inmates had not shown sufficient evidence of pain” or
likelihood of psychological trauma as a result of the searches “to
169
make out a cognizable Eighth Amendment claim.”
Thus, the
majority reasoned that because the precedent was based solely on a
male prisoner’s reaction to being searched by a female guard, which
does not raise the same societal and constitutional concerns as the
170
touching of a woman by a man, it was inapposite.
By explicitly
weighing the significance of gender, the court was able to reach a
171
conclusion contrary to controlling precedent.
The consideration of gender when analyzing whether conditions
of confinement constitute cruel and unusual punishment is not
172
improper under current Eighth Amendment doctrine.
“The
Eighth Amendment is supposed to protect all prisoners, regardless of
gender, from cruel and unusual punishment in conditions of
173
confinement.”
If one accepts the basic assumption that cognitive
perceptions of men and women sometimes differ, then the
experience of incarceration for men and women should also differ.
As a result, the “objective” part of the test for cruel and unusual
punishment must take into account the perceptions of both men and
174
women.
An inquiry that fails to consider gender differences would
be based on male experiences and would therefore lose its
175
objectivity.
Thus, the test for cruel and unusual punishment must
167

Id.
Id.
169
Jordan, 986 F.2d at 1526.
170
Id.
171
See id.
172
See Krim, supra note 19, at 105.
173
Id. (emphasis added).
174
See id. In Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958), the Supreme Court held that
when interpreting the Eighth Amendment, courts must recognize that the power to
punish must be “exercised within the limits of civilized standards.” The Court noted
that courts “must draw [the Eighth Amendment’s meaning from evolving standards
of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.” Id.
175
Feminist legal scholars call the adoption of men’s experiences as neutral
standards “masculine jurisprudence.” Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1 (1988); see also SANDRA HARDING, WHOSE SCIENCE? WHOSE KNOWLEDGE?
168
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properly measure the psychological harm to female inmates, as well
as men.
The Ninth Circuit is certainly not the only court that recognized
the importance of distinguishing the needs of men and women in a
176
legal context.
Evidence of how women’s perceptions can differ
from men’s perceptions can be found in sexual harassment law.
Hostile environment doctrine, for example, begins from an
understanding of the way in which women and men are likely to
177
experience differently practices challenged as sexual harassment.
For example, although many women hold positive attitudes about
178
consensual sex, “their greater physical and social vulnerability to
179
This
sexual coercion can make women wary of sexual encounters.”
perspective is also consistent with feminist scholarship in several areas
of the criminal law that asks advocates and judges to adopt the
perspective of the woman (usually the victim) in formulating and
180
181
adjudicating the elements of a crime.
In State v. Wanrow, for

THINKING OF WOMEN’S LIVES 134-37 (1991); Christine A. Littleton, Women’s Experience
and the Problem of Transition: Perspectives on Male Battering of Women, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL
F. 23, 32 (1989).
176
See, e.g., Yates v. Avco Corp., 819 F.2d 630, 637 n.2 (6th Cir. 1987)
(acknowledging that “men and women are vulnerable in different ways and offended
by different behavior”).
177
In sexual harassment cases, courts have routinely used a gender-sensitive
reasonable person standard in assessing whether workplace conditions represent a
hostile or abusive environment. See, e.g., Harris v. Forklift Sys. Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 25
(1993) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (reiterating that the “critical issue” in harassment
cases is “whether members of one sex are exposed to disadvantageous terms or
conditions of employment to which members of the other sex are not exposed.”).
178
Kathryn Abrams, Gender Discrimination and the Transformation of Workplace Norms,
42 VAND. L. REV. 1183, 1205 (1989).
179
Id.; see also BARBARA GUTEK, SEX AND THE WORKPLACE 47-54 (1985). Barbara
Gutek’s empirical investigation of sex in the workplace reveals that women are more
likely to regard a sexual encounter — verbal or physical — as coercive. Id. They are
less likely to view such encounters as flattering and more likely to see them as signs of
the virility of the perpetrator. Id. In contrast, men are less likely to regard such
conduct as harassing, and more likely to view it as a flattering reflection of their
attributes. Id. Men are also more likely to perceive such encounters as mutually
desired, whereas women are more apt to regard the encounters as desired only by
the more powerful, initiating party. Id.
180
See, e.g., Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087, 1091-94 (1986) (arguing that
“[i]n rape, the male standard defines a crime committed against women,” and
urging revision of standards used for adjudicating force and resistance to reflect
women’s perspectives); Elizabeth M. Schneider, Equal Rights to Trial for Women: Sex
Bias in the Law of Self-Defense, 15 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 623, 630-38 (1980) (arguing
that in cases involving homicide by battered women legal rules governing the
reasonableness of self-defense evaluate women’s conduct by a male standard but
should reflect the perspective of the battered woman).
181
559 P.2d 548 (Wash. 1977).
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example, the Washington State Supreme Court allowed the use of a
“battered woman” defense, noting:
Until such time as the effects of that history are eradicated, care
must be taken to assure that our self-defense instructions afford
women the right to have their conduct judged in light of the
individual physical handicaps which are the product of sex
182
discrimination.

In fact, in the majority of jurisdictions, juries are instructed to use a
reasonableness standard, which includes the defendant’s individual
183
subjective experiences.
Thus, courts should likewise measure the
psychological harm women suffer when subjected to unwanted
sexualized touching by male security guards by how women perceive
the harm.
C. Courts’ Acknowledgment of the Differential Effect of Cross-Gender
Searches on Women
The plight of women in prison has become a growing societal
concern in the past twenty years as the number of incarcerated
184
women has increased dramatically.
Consequently, courts and state
legislators are beginning to recognize that female inmates have
185
unique needs.
In addressing the legal claims of female inmates,
the courts have, for the most part, applied standards developed
186
within the context of the experiences of male prisoners. Yet, in the
application of these standards, some attention has been paid to the
differential effect of such policies on women and the significance of

182

Id. at 559.
See Elizabeth M. Schneider, Describing and Changing: Women’s Self-Defense Work
and the Problem of Expert Testimony on Battering, 9 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 195, 219
(1986); see also Phyllis L. Crocker, The Meaning of Equality for Battered Women Who Kill
Men in Self-Defense, 8 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 121, 125 (1985) (describing the majority test
as requiring reference to the defendant’s individual circumstances, but nonetheless
labeling the test “an objective standard”).
184
See George J. Church, The View from Behind the Bars: The Number of Women
Inmates Tripled in the Past Decade. Most of Them are Mothers. They Face a System Designed
and Run for Men by Men, TIME, Sept. 1990, at 20.
185
The lack of access to abortions, treatment for drug-addicted pregnant women,
gynecological care, child custody rights, HIV treatment protocols, and prison
programs and services have been challenged as constitutionally inadequate. See, e.g.,
Women Prisoners of D.C. Dep’t of Corr. v. District of Columbia, 93 F.3d 910, 913-19
(D.C. Cir. 1996) (illustrating the types of challenges pertinent to female prisoners
including “sexual misconduct, their general living conditions, the quality of their
obstetrical and gynecological care, and discrimination in access to academic,
vocational, work, and recreational programs”).
186
See Jurado, supra note 19, at 6.
183
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187

the gender of the inmates and guards.
188
For example, in Forts v. Ward, female inmates incarcerated at
New York State’s Bedford Hills Correctional Facility claimed that the
policy of assigning male guards to the prison’s living and sleeping
corridors, which included the areas where women showered, violated
their right to privacy because they would be “involuntarily exposed to
189
view while partially or completely unclothed . . . .”
The district
court found no reason to ban male guards from assignment in the
housing corridors during the day because the prison permitted
inmates to cover their cell door windows for up to fifteen minutes
190
while dressing.
The court, however, found that the assignment of
male guards to the corridors during the night, when the prison
prohibited inmates from covering their windows, violated the
191
inmates’ right of privacy. The lower court also found that installing
screens in the shower facilities could easily correct invasions of
192
On appeal,
privacy that occurred while inmates were showering.
the Second Circuit overturned the removal of male guards from
nighttime shifts, holding that the exclusion was unjustifiable gender193
based employment discrimination.
The court reasoned that the
prison could accommodate the privacy rights of female prisoners by
providing appropriate sleepwear and by allowing the women to cover
their cell door for fifteen minutes during the evening just as they are
194
permitted to do during the day time.
The Ninth Circuit has not
made similar accommodations when male prisoners have asserted
195
Thus, by
their right to be free from cross-gender surveillance.

187

See Colman v. Vasquez, 142 F. Supp. 2d 226, 232 (D. Conn. 2001) (noting
courts’ recognition of the difference in privacy rights when male guards monitor
female inmates and female guards monitor male inmates); Timm v. Gunter, 917 F.2d
1093, 1102-03 (8th Cir. 1990) (quoting Timm v. Gunter, No. CV85-L-501, at 15-16
(D. Neb. Dec. 13, 1988) (Memorandum of Decision))(stating that differences in
privacy protections afforded to male and female inmates do not violate the
Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause because male and female inmates
“are not similarly situated”).
188
621 F.2d 1210 (2d Cir. 1980).
189
Id. at 1213. The male guards’ duties required them to look into the cells of
female prisoners during the evening “count.” Id. at 1216.
190
Id. (citing Forts v. Ward, 471 F. Supp. 1095, 1101 (S.D.N.Y. 1977)).
191
Id.
192
Id. at 1214 (citing Forts, 471 F. Supp. at 1102).
193
Id. at 1215.
194
Forts v. Ward, 621 F.2d 1210, 1217 (2d Cir. 1980).
195
See, e.g., Somers v. Thurman, 109 F.3d 614, 622 (9th Cir. 1997) (stating that it is
“highly questionable even today” whether prisoners have a right to be free from
cross-gender surveillance when unclothed); Michenfelder v. Sumner, 860 F.2d 328,
333-34 (9th Cir. 1988) (finding no constitutional violation of privacy where male
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allowing female prisoners to maintain a greater degree of modesty
than had generally been afforded to male prisoners, the Second
Circuit implicitly acknowledged the unique needs of women in
196
prison.
197
In Torres v. Wisconsin Department of Health and Social Services,
male guards challenged their exclusion from surveillance posts within
a women’s prison. The Seventh Circuit held that the department of
corrections had not established a sufficient basis to justify a genderbased exclusion because it had complied with the policies set forth in
198
Forts v. Ward.
The court found that the existing prison policies
provided sufficient opportunity, through the use of curtains, shower
doors, and privacy cards, for women prisoners to shield themselves
199
from male officers.
It is notable, however, that the Wisconsin
system did not provide male prisoners the same opportunity for
200
privacy from cross-gender viewing.
Thus, the court did not reach
the same result with respect to the privacy interests of female
prisoners subject to cross-gender surveillance as it had with the rights
of male prisoners.
The defendants in Torres also argued that the assignment of male
guards to the women’s unit would undermine the prisoners’
rehabilitation because the women had suffered physical and/or
201
sexual abuse at the hands of men.
The trial court and initial
appellate court opinions refused to accept this argument because the
defendants did not present objective evidence to support their
202
theory.
An en banc panel vacated the appellate decision and
guards performed visual body-cavity searches of male prisoners occasionally in view
of female guards); Grummett v. Rushen, 779 F.2d 491, 492 (9th Cir. 1985) (rejecting
the Fourth Amendment challenge to a prison policy that allowed “female
correctional officers to view male inmates in states of partial or total nudity while
dressing, showering, being strip searched, or using toilet facilities . . . .”)
196
See Lee v. Downs, 641 F.2d 1117 (4th Cir. 1981) (upholding a jury verdict for
the violation of the privacy interests of a female inmate forced to undress in the
presence of male guards).
197
859 F.2d 1523 (7th Cir. 1988).
198
Id. at 1526.
199
Id.
200
Torres v. Wisconsin Dep’t of Health and Soc. Serv., 639 F. Supp. 271, 277 (E.D.
Wisc. 1986) (“Female correctional officers employed at male prisons in Wisconsin
testified at trial that they routinely conduct inspections of the shower and toilet areas
at those prisons and often see male inmates in various states of undress at those
prisons. Furthermore, they are authorized, and sometimes required to conduct patsearches on male inmates.”)
201
Torres, 859 F.2d at 1530 (noting that sixty percent of female inmates had been
sexually abused in the past, which could cause them to be uncomfortable with
surveillance by male guards).
202
Id. at 1532.
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reversed and remanded the trial court order and judgment.
The
Seventh Circuit held that the trial court had applied too strict a
204
requirement of empirical evidence, acknowledging that it is socially
accepted wisdom that “the presence of unrelated males in living
spaces where intimate bodily functions take place is a cause of stress
205
to females.”
206
In Coleman v. Vasquez, a female inmate placed in a special unit
for victims of sexual abuse filed a Section 1983 action against prison
officials alleging that she was sexually abused by a male guard, and
challenging the constitutionality of the prison’s cross-gender patsearches. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss arguing that the
complaint did not allege a cause of action under the Fourth
Amendment since the Eighth Amendment is the “explicit textual
source of constitutional protection” for alleged infringements of
207
prisoners’ rights. The district court denied the motion, rejecting as
a matter of law the suggestion that an inmate in the given
208
circumstance has no claim under the Fourth Amendment.
Acknowledging that the defendants may be able to prove at trial that
the prison conducted the searches “pursuant to a constitutionally
209
valid policy,” the court refused to decide on the pleadings alone
whether the plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment right was “clearly
210
The court stressed the need for further factual
established.”
development on the specific “pat-search policy, the justification for its
adoption, the frequency with which inmates in the Sexual Trauma
211
Unit are subject to pat-searches, and the other [Turner factors].”
Although the court did not reach this ultimate issue, it carefully
distinguished the situation in which an inmate has “particular
vulnerabilities” due to her sexual abuse history from the numerous
cases in other jurisdictions allowing pat-searches by guards of the
212
opposite sex.
The gender of the inmates in each case clearly influenced the

203

Id. at 1532-33.
Id. at 1531-32 (asserting that defendant need not supply empirical evidence to
establish a bona fide occupational qualification, known as a BFOQ defense).
205
Id. (referencing cases that upheld the exclusion of male nurses in the labor
and delivery areas of hospitals).
206
142 F. Supp. 2d 226 (D. Conn. 2001).
207
Id. at 230.
208
Id.
209
Id. at 232.
210
Id. at 233.
211
Id.
212
Coleman, 142 F. Supp. 2d at 232.
204
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courts’ reasoning in Forts, Torres, and Coleman. The court deemed
appropriate increased protection for women on the basis of their
experiences as victims of sexual abuse at the hands of males. This
consideration of gender difference is consistent with the holding in
Jordan that the female inmates suffered “pain” when subjected to
intrusive clothed body searches performed by male guards.
IV. THE RELATIVE UNINTRUSIVENESS OF CROSS-GENDER SEARCHES OF
MALE INMATES
While some courts have acknowledged that pat-down searches
213
are indeed offensive, they nevertheless justify their findings that
searches of male inmates by female officers are reasonable on the
214
basis of the relatively unintrusive nature of the challenged conduct.
215
In Michenfelder v. Sumner, for example, the Ninth Circuit held that
because the searches were merely visual and involved no touching,
they were distinguishable from those held to be unreasonable by the
216
First Circuit in Bonitz v. Fair.
In Bonitz, police officers conducted
contact body-cavity searches of female inmates without medical
personnel, in a non-hygienic manner, and “in the presence of male
217
officers.”
Thus, the relative unintrusiveness of the searches at issue
in Michenfelder made them more acceptable.
218
Likewise, the Seventh Circuit in Smith v. Fairman, held that by
instructing female guards to exclude the genital area on male
inmates when conducting frisks, the defendants “afforded plaintiff
219
whatever privacy right” to which he may be entitled.
While the
Ninth Circuit embraced York’s concern about shielding one’s naked
220
it
body from the view of persons of the opposite gender,
nevertheless held in Grummett that the search did not violate this
limited privacy right because the viewing was occasional, the clothed
pat-down searches did “not involve intimate contact with an inmate’s

213

See, e.g., Smith v. Fairman, 678 F.2d 52, 53 (7th Cir. 1982) (“For our present
purposes we will assume that having to endure what is commonly referred to as a
frisk or pat-down search could to some persons be a humiliating and degrading
experience. Even so limited a search as this, ‘is a serious intrusion upon the sanctity
of the person, which may inflict great indignity and arouse strong resentment, and it
is not to be taken lightly.’”).
214
See United States v. Lilly, 576 F.2d 1240 (5th Cir. 1978).
215
860 F.2d 328 (9th Cir. 1988).
216
804 F.2d 164 (1st Cir. 1986).
217
Id. at 172.
218
678 F.2d 52 (7th Cir. 1982).
219
Id. at 55.
220
Grummett, 779 F.2d at 495.
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body, [and] . . . the female guards conducted themselves in a
221
professional manner.”
222
The District Court of Oregon in Bagley v. Watson articulated a
standard for determining the extent to which cross-gender search
policies impinge on a male prisoner’s reasonable expectation of
223
privacy.
In holding that male prisoners did not suffer any
constitutional harm by being viewed or searched by female guards,
the court relied upon expert testimony that described the possible
reason for the male prisoners’ claims of harm:
According to Kissel and Siedel, the majority of men who claim
that having women in the housing units constitutes an invasion of
their privacy are, upon closer inspection of their complaints,
merely complaining about the inconvenience caused by having to
maintain their privacy, largely, as they see it, for the needs of the
women officers. . . . It is my belief that it is misleading to label
concern with this inconvenience with women ‘invading
224
privacy.’

The court therefore held that while men may prefer to be searched
or viewed by male guards, “the indignity perceived by some male
inmates . . . do[es] not justify discrimination against women in
employment so as to constitute a BFOQ exception”—a bona fide
occupational qualification justifying the discriminatory employment
225
practice under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.
Thus, the Bagley
court reasoned that while society is prepared to recognize men’s
interest in bodily privacy, this interest is de minimis when compared to
226
the employment rights of female officers.
The court made clear,
however, that its opinion was limited to the rights of male prisoners,
explicitly stating that male guards searching female prisoners was a
227
different issue.
The distinction drawn by the court suggests that
the harm imposed when men search women may be more significant
than when women search men and therefore merits greater
consideration when weighed against the employment rights of male
guards.
The searches at issue in the Jordan case were significantly more
221

Id.
579 F. Supp. 1099 (D. Or. 1983).
223
Id. at 1102.
224
Id.
225
Id. at 1105.
226
See id. (noting that “the female officers’ federal rights to equal employment . . .
supercede the male inmates’ rights to be free from unnecessary rigor under the
Oregon constitution”).
227
Id.
222
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intrusive than those in prior cases, because in all of the cases
considered by the Ninth Circuit the male guards did not touch the
228
female inmates’ breasts, buttocks, or genital areas.
Likewise, none
of the plaintiffs in prior cases had shown on the basis of statistical
psychological evidence that cross-gender searches could cause
psychological trauma. The fact that gender may influence whether
an inmate experiences a search as overly intrusive requires courts to
re-examine the balance previously struck wherein courts accorded
less protection to the privacy rights of male inmates than to the equal
employment rights of female prison guards.
V. ONE POSSIBLE EXPLANATION FOR THE JORDAN MAJORITY’S FOURTH
AMENDMENT ANALYSIS
The absence of any mention of gender with respect to the
inmates’ Fourth Amendment claim in the Jordan opinion indicates
that there was more to the court’s careful reluctance to reach the
Fourth Amendment issues than the opinion suggests. While it is
impossible to know for certain why the majority preferred the Eighth
Amendment to the Fourth Amendment, it may have been concerned
about the legal and societal implications of recognizing a
constitutional right for women that had not previously been
recognized for men. It may have also thought that to use societal
expectations as the standard for evaluating privacy expectations
would have undermined Title VII’s mandate that stereotypes not
229
limit employment opportunities.
One theorist, Rebecca Jurado,
230
has explicitly voiced such concern.
She argues that “courts’
reliance on the fact that women are victims of rape, as well as . . . the
societal notion that any touching of a woman is sexual misconduct,”
231
has imbued women with a greater need for privacy than men.
According to Jurado, the court’s reliance on this information
supports the notion that there is an essential nature to all women—
232
namely, that all women are potential victims.
In Jurado’s view, the
rights of women should instead be “founded upon their strengths
and experiences, not in continuing stereotypes that limit their role to

228

See the discussion of Ninth Circuit inmate pat-frisk cases discussed supra note

195.

229

See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2002).
See Jurado, supra note 19, at 53.
231
Id. at 6; see also Teresa A. Miller, Keeping the Government’s Hands Off Our Bodies:
Mapping a Feminist Legal Theory Approach to Privacy in Cross-Gender Prison Searches, 4
BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 861 (2001).
232
Jurado, supra note 18, at 2-3.
230

2002

CROSS-GENDER PAT-FRISKS

63

233

that of victims.”
The group of feminist legal theorists known as equal treatment
advocates have voiced the more general fear that by focusing on
women’s differences the legal system will exacerbate discrimination
234
against women.
They argue that by using a “special” standard for
women, the courts perpetuate traditional gender imagery of men as
235
While I recognize
aggressive actors and women as passive victims.
that my argument emphasizes that women have been victimized by
sexualized repression, I would respond to such criticism as Catherine
236
MacKinnon has: “I am merely telling it as it is.”
Contrary to what Jurado and possibly the Jordan majority
thought, the consideration of gender with respect to the inmates’
Fourth Amendment claim would not have necessitated the
recognition of a greater right to privacy for women. Nor would it
have required the articulation of a separate standard for women. All
that was needed was for the court, when it balanced the limited
privacy rights of all inmates, to have analyzed the intrusiveness of the
searches from the perspective of women who have most likely been
abused at the hands of men. A finding that WCCW’s cross-gender
policy violated the Fourth Amendment would merely have meant that
for this population of female inmates, the psychological harm caused
by these searches made them “unreasonable.”
Pat-frisks of intimate body parts are intrusive and degrading to
inmates in all contexts. When, however, a male guard searches a
female inmate’s body, a woman is apt to experience not only the
degradation of having the most intimate parts of her body exposed or
explored, but also fear that the male guard will abuse his power in
233

Id. at 53.
For an overview of feminist legal theory, see Carrie Menkel-Meadow,
Mainstreaming Feminist Legal Theory, 23 PAC. L.J. 1493 (1992). For a discussion of
feminist analysis of privacy in cross-gender searches, see Miller, supra note 231, at
875-89.
235
See, e.g., Lucinda M. Finley, The Nature of Domination and the Nature of Women:
Reflections on Feminism Unmodified, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 352, 377 (1988).
236
CATHERINE MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES OF LIFE AND LAW
220 (1987). Mackinnon writes:
[T]he parade of horrors demonstrating the systematic victimization of
women often produces the criticism that for me to say women are
victimized reinforces the stereotype that women ‘are’ victims, which in
turn contributes to their victimization. If this stereotype is a stereotype,
it has already been accomplished, and I come after. To those who
think ‘it isn’t good for women to think of themselves as victims,’ and
thus seek to deny the reality of their victimization, how can it be good
for women to deny what is happening to them?
Id.
234
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237

the situation and sexually abuse her.
The fear is even more acute
238
for those who have suffered past abuse.
The extreme invasiveness
of these searches makes the state’s burden of establishing that these
searches are reasonably necessary to accommodate a legitimate
penological interest — and that there is no realistic alternative to
accomplish the same goal — much harder to meet. Constitutional
theorist Akhil Amar has called this idea the proportionality principle,
arguing that more serious intrusions require more weighty
239
justifications.
Under Fourth Amendment law, the permissibility of a given
intrusion turns on its “reasonableness” under particular
240
The Supreme Court has emphasized, however, that
circumstances.
the concept of “reasonableness,” must take into account the common
241
sense of ordinary people.
Searches that “create opportunities for
sexual oppression, harassment, or embarrassment” generally offend
242
Therefore, common sense tells us that
basic notions of morality.
they cannot be “reasonable” in the ordinary sense of the word. How
can a search that is adjudged to cause a sufficient level of “pain” as to
constitute “cruel and unusual punishment” under the Eighth
Amendment be considered “reasonable”? A policy allowing men to
touch women in a sexualized manner capable of triggering a
traumatic response must therefore be “unreasonable” under the
Fourth Amendment—unreasonable because it reinforces gender
subordination and offends basic values and concepts of human
243
dignity.

237

This fear of abuse is based on widespread instances of sexual abuse in women’s
prisons. See, e.g., Human Rights Watch, supra note 6, at 1-2, finding that male
correctional officers often misuse their search authority to have inappropriate sexual
contact with female prisoners. See also AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 6, at 5556.
238
See Heney & Kristiansen, supra note 7 and accompanying text.
239
Akhil Reed Amar, Terry and the Future: Terry and Fourth Amendment First
Principles, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1097, 1120 (1998) (noting that the Supreme Court
focused in Terry v. Ohio on both the “depth and breadth of an intrusion”).
240
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
241
See Jerome Atrens, A Comparison of Canadian and American Constitutional Law
Relating to Search and Seizure, 1 SW. J.L. & TRADE AM. 29, 35 (1994) (discussing the
Supreme Court’s emphasis on normative reasonableness or what “the ordinary
person has come to expect in society” in its Fourth Amendment jurisprudence);
Amar, supra note 239, at 1120 (common sense understanding should inform “the
interpretation of a Constitution that speaks in the name of ordinary people”).
242
See Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757,
808-809 (1994); see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 17 n.14 (stating that “the degree of
community resentment aroused by particular practices is clearly relevant”).
243
See Amar, supra note 242, at 41.
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Rather than suggesting that women have a greater right to
bodily privacy than men, I am arguing that privacy analysis under the
Fourth Amendment must be highly contextualized and grounded in
fundamental respect for human dignity and bodily integrity. For
example, for the particular population of women subjected to the
Jordan policy, the psychological harm caused by cross-gender searches
is “unreasonable” when balanced against the institutional concerns of
the prison. That women’s claims should be highly contexualized
does not prevent men from demonstrating Fourth Amendment
violations when appropriate; if male inmates can show a comparable
level of psychological harm as a result of cross-gender pat-frisks, then
they too should be able to sustain a claim under the Fourth
Amendment. Critics may claim that consideration of the subjective
experiences of women will impose a huge burden on the courts. By
focusing, however, on the intrusiveness of the searches, the courts
already employ a fact-specific approach.
CONCLUSION
One way out of this quagmire would be for courts to recognize a
general right to bodily integrity for both free and incarcerated
individuals. Such a view flows out of the Ninth Circuit’s expressed
244
concern in York v. Story about privacy in the naked body. “The
desire to shield one’s unclothed figure from the view of strangers,
and particularly strangers of the opposite sex, is impelled by
245
elementary self-respect and personal dignity.”
While agreeing with
the basic nature of this aspect of privacy, some courts distinguish York
because it involved a female crime victim rather than a prisoner.
Thus, until society is ready to recognize that prisoners are individuals
worthy of the same constitutional protections as free citizens, the
courts must continue to consider all relevant contextual factors when
determining the reasonableness of a cross-gender body search under
the Fourth Amendment. In the situation of male corrections officers
searching female inmates, this means that the courts must take into
account the subjective experience of unwanted sexualized touching
from the perspective of a woman, who may or may not have been
abused prior to incarceration. Although privacy is genderless,
concern for symmetry in the treatment of searches must not mean
244

324 F.2d 450 (9th Cir. 1963).
Id. at 455. In holding that the distribution of photographs of a nude female
assault victim invaded the privacy rights guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, the court wrote that it could not “conceive of a more basic
subject of privacy than the naked body.” Id.
245
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that critical differences in the sexualization of power get overlooked.

